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Abstract 
The paper explores the feasibility of the use of weather index based derivatives for farms’ risk 
management in an Italian province. Based on a combination of detailed local weather data and 
of data on farms’ yields, various possible weather indexes are found that are highly correlated 
with yields of the major crops in the area. Simulations show that hedging through such index 
based derivatives can be effective in protecting the stability of farms’ incomes, at a cost that is 
likely to be much lower than that of the current system of subsidized crop insurance and ex-
post compensation. 
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Introduction. 
Since 1974, when the Italian Fondo di Solidarietà Nazionale in Agricoltura (FSN) was 
created, risk management in the Italian agriculture has been strongly influenced by the 
intrusive presence of the public sector. The rhetoric has been that farmers alone either would 
not correctly perceive the risk they faced, or could not adequately manage their risk, given the 
limited development of the markets for risk management tools, and therefore the intervention 
of a “benevolent State” was needed. 
The intervention evolved in the forms of a subsidy to crop insurance premiums paid by 
farmers, and of ex-post compensation for damages that were not covered by insurance. The 
budget allocated to the FSN over the years has been non negligible. In the period 1981-2002, 
the average yearly public expense for this kind of assistance has been of 225 Million €.  
                                                 
∗   Carlo Cafiero, Fabian Capitanio and Michele Vollaro are assistant professor, research associate and PhD 
student at the Università di Napoli Federico II, Dipartimento di Economia e Politica Agraria. Federica 
Angelucci is researcher, International Office of the Confederazione Italiana Agricoltori. The paper is the 
product of the joint effort of the four authors, although Carlo Cafiero took the lead in drafting sections 1, 3, 4 
and 5, Federica Angelucci contributed to section 1 and drafted section 2, while Fabian Capitanio and Michele 
Vollaro focused in collecting and processing data. The contribution of Dr. Gaetano Zipoli of CNR Toscana 
and of Dr. Giuseppe Pennucci of the Italian Ministry of Agriculture is very gratefully acknowledged. Figure  1:  Italy FSN expenditure for compensation payments and insurance 
premium subsidies 1981 – 2007 (Mln €) 
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However, the results of the strong Government’s involvement are rather disappointing if we 
consider that, after more than 30 years of assistance through release of premium subsidies, the 
market for crop insurance has not been able to develop beyond that for a few risks (typically 
hail and fire) that existed and were widely used even before the strong public involvement. 
On the other hand, ex-post compensation has absorbed the larger share of the available funds, 
until recently, when it has been limited by the availability of public funds rather than by the 
competing role played by market-based preventative actions, suggesting that the demand for it 
has been strong and not related to the competing role of insurance. 
A fair interpretation of such state of affairs would highlight at least two important points that 
this paper tries to assess, and that relate to forms of both market and state failures. First, 
agricultural risk has characters that make traditional market based instruments (such as 
traditional insurance) less effective than internal solutions and strategies (such as those based 
on income source diversification, storage and marketing management, technological 
innovation adoption, and so forth). Second, once a public institution that generates rents at 
various levels has been created, it is very difficult to reform or to abolish it. What should 
appear clear by now, based on the long Italian experience, is that the combination of a failing 
market with a failing State is hardly capable of assisting farmers in dealing with their risk. 
The research we are conducting and whose preliminary results we present in this paper tries to 
provide indications for a possible solution to the highlighted inefficiencies, by reconsidering 
what the fundamental origin of production risk in agriculture is, why traditional market 
instruments fail, and why the presence of the State – at least the way in which it has been 
common in Italy – has been more detrimental than beneficial to farmers and to the general 
public. 
We advance the possibility that the most relevant component of production risk, i.e., the one 
that can be either directly or indirectly traced back to the variability weather conditions, could 
be dealt with use of appropriately designed derivatives whose underlying asset is a combination of objectively measurable local weather indexes. The mechanism could either be 
exploited by a Government that wants to provide assistance to farmers in managing their 
production risk, or used by insurance companies to design effective crop yield coverage. 
The advantages of such an option over the current system of subsidized crop insurance and 
ex-post compensation would be manifold. First, the problems related to asymmetric 
information on the actual extent of damages would disappear. If the contract is appropriately 
designed, that is, if compensation is based on the index value rather than on the actually 
measured farm’s loss, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard would plague this type of 
insurance. No single farmer would be able to strategically affect the value of the composite 
weather index, and no costly damage adjustment is needed.  
Second, the public nature of the weather information, as opposed to the private information 
that insurance companies have on the past performance of their insurance funds, might 
stimulate competition among supplier of risk management tools, therefore by reducing the 
problem of rent capturing that so often plagues the insurance industry.  
Third, yield risk management through weather index based derivatives could complement the 
management of other relevant risks, such as for example price risk, that for some commodities 
can also be managed through financial instruments.  
Fourth, the development of such a system would require no major reform in the existing 
legislative framework, to the extent that index based coverage could be included among the 
possible contracts offered by insurance companies to farmers (and, at the beginning, also 
entitled to public support, in accordance with the EU guidelines on state aids) or among the 
publicly provided risk management tools (for example, by linking ex-post compensation in an 
area to specific values of the composite index rather than to a complex and politically 
vulnerable mechanism of disaster declaration). 
The main practical problem that need to be resolved is the discovery of the most appropriate 
weather index to be used, and this is the research direction that we take here. Such an index 
needs to be highly correlated to the production that one aims at protecting, and it may well be 
highly specific to the specific homogeneous area that one intends to cover. Fortunately, the 
existence of a diffused network of weather stations makes the problem less relevant for the 
conditions of the current Italian agriculture, of what it might be, for example, for the 
conditions of less developed Countries.  
In this paper, we present the preliminary results obtained by comparing the time series of 
weather data collected for an Italian province with the series of yields of the major crops for 
the same province, and show how the index could be formed and utilized to define an 
insurance contract. The results are to be considered still preliminary, given that delay in 
obtaining longer series of the weather indexes and more detailed local yield data has, up to 
now, prevented us to explore some of the implications of the proposed scheme. Nevertheless, 
we feel that the material presented is sufficient to feed a fruitful discussion on the topic. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section 2, a brief overview of the past history and 
current status of agricultural risk management in Italy is presented, to the aim of highlighting 
the major problems that afflict it. Then, in section 3, a simple method for finding a suitable 
weather index is described and applied to the case study of three crops in the Italian province 
of Grosseto. Section 4 will discuss the results obtained and the limit of the analysis performed 
so far, suggesting the directions for further research in which we are currently involved, and 
the final section 5 concludes by summarizing the main results and by providing the initial 
possible practical implementation guidelines. 2  The current system of agricultural risk management in Italy 
Public intervention in agricultural risk management in Italy has a long tradition. The Fondo di 
Solidarietà Nazionale in Agricoltura (FSN) was instituted in 1974 with the aim of providing 
farmers with the means to effectively manage their production risk. The system has evolved 
over the years with numerous reforms until recently, when Italy has adopted the Community 
guidelines for state aid in the agricultural sector concerning compensation for damages and 
insurance premium subsidy, with the issue in 2004 of the Legislative Decree n° 102 on the 
29th of March. The Decree defines new operational rules for the FSN and disciplines on 
financial tools for risk management and capitalisation incentives in favour of agricultural 
firms. The Italian FSN is composed of two different supply services: financing of insurance 
policy and ex-post payments, although this general principle is subject to many exceptions 
that will be described in the following paragraphs. 
2.1 Ex-post  compensation 
The Law instituting the FSN states that, in case an exceptional events occur, farmers are 
entitled to a compensation for the damages suffered.  
The discipline of the compensation aid has not changed very much over time.
1 In order to 
activate the compensation, the status of exceptional event needs to be official recognized by 
the Central Government. To this aim, when an adverse event occurs (most commonly 
drought, flood and late frost) the involved regional Governments present a request to the 
Ministry of agriculture that, after verifying the actual extent of damages, issues the decree 
which entitled farmers to ask for compensation. 
Compensations are then paid based on criteria that are determined by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, depending on the availability of funds and on the actual extent of damages. The 
criteria according to which compensation aids are provided by the Ministry of Agriculture is 
the decrease in the value of production below a specified threshold. The correlation between 
actual damages and compensations received is therefore very weak. The lack of an objective 
criteria that allows a proper assessment of the real causes and extent of damages has led to a 
persistent discrepancy between the amount of compensations claimed by the farmers through 
the regional representatives and the amount of compensation actually paid. 
 
Table 1:  comparison  between  damage  evaluation by Regions and real State 
expenditure for compensation aid in Mln/€ 
Year  Assessment of damages according to 
the Regions’ administrations 
Compensation aid paid 
2002 1,208  204 
2003 1,380  127 
2004 -  100 
2005 947  100 
2006 659  50 
                                                 
1 The various laws concerning the FSN have only modified the damage threshold that defines an exceptional 
event, to make it consistent with the guidelines on State aids in agriculture and with the provisions of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Decree no. 102 of 2004 has set the damage threshold at 30% of 
normal average production. 2.2   Subsidised crop insurance 
The current crop insurance system in Italy, as defined by the Legislative Decree n° 102-2004 
and the subsequent Ministerial decrees related to specific questions, has the following main 
features: 
-  Insurable events concerning crops: hail, wind, frost, drought, excess of rain, flood. For 
what concerns farm structures, the insurable events are: hail, snow, wind, tornados, 
hurricanes and lightning; 
-  Regarding insurable crops, the Ministerial Decrees which define the Annual Insurance 
Plan have extended to almost all crops the entitlement to premium subsidy. The 
structures that can benefit of public subsidy are hail nets and greenhouses. Starting 
from 2006, subsidised insurance is allowed also for losses deriving from cattle disease. 
-  According to Legislative Decree n° 102-2004 the insurance schemes entitled to state 
subsidy are: single-peril, combined/named perils, and finally, multi-peril policies 
depending on the fact that the insurance contracts covers one or more predetermined 
perils. The last two insurance schemes are considered on an experimental basis. This 
implies that they benefit of 80% premium subsidy. Starting from year 2007 the related 
annual crop insurance plan, as a consequence of the fact that the European 
Commission has not recognised the exception in favour of multi and named peril that 
the Italian government has introduced in its crop insurance system, has established the 
end of the experimental phase for all perils except drought and floods. This means that 
farmers who have not subscribed any kind of insurance scheme against drought and/or 
floods could still benefit of compensation aids. 
From year 2007 on, State contribution is granted up to a maximum of 80% of the premium 
and only to those policies which pay an indemnity when at least 30% of the average 
production is damaged, thus eliminating the threshold of 20% if losses occurred in 
disadvantaged areas. 
The total amount of State intervention is defined in the annual insurance plan and depends on 
public budget and on the number of farmers who have subscribed policies. The terms through 
which public subsidy is granted are subordinated to the actual availability of public resources 
(Ministerial Decree of 15th of July 2004). In order to adapt public subsidy to real risk 
exposure of single areas and regions, State financial requirements are defined annually on the 
basis of parameters. State contribution varies according to different elements: type of 
insurance scheme; area; weather event, insurance cover; type of crop and/or structure. 
Starting from the 1st of January 2005, farmers are obliged to subscribe crop insurance for the 
whole area devoted to the crop they want to insure that falls within the borders of the 
township they belong to. Subscription of policies can be both on an individual and on a 
collective basis (through Consorzi di Difesa, cooperatives and their operating consortiums). 
The current legislation also allows farmers to create mutual funds. They operate in favour of 
insured crops and structures and for those crops and structures which have been damaged and 
are not included in the annual insurance plan. The condition for acceding to payments is that 
loss regards at least 30% of crop production. Aids can consist of different kind of 
intervention, such as: investment grant, five year graduated payment loans, national insurance 
contribution, credit operations deferment. 
2.3  Diffusion of crop insurance in Italy 
2005 represents the first year of full implementation of Reform of the Italian crop insurance 
system because, starting from the 1st January 2005 the obligation of insuring the whole 
production of a certain crop is in force. For what concerns the spread of crop insurance after the reform of the system, available data 
do not seem to show a significant  change in comparison with the past situation: the number 
of contracts subscribed has not increased radically.   
In terms of insured hectares there has been an increase that is due to the obligation of insuring 
the entire cropped area of a certain commodity. In 2004, there has been an increase of insured 
production value but again in 2005 this value has not shown a positive growth.  
State contribution is constantly increasing annually, unfortunately, this is not due exclusively 
to the increase of policies but depends also on the rise of unit prices of agricultural products 
and the increasing share of combined perils policies that by law can benefit of the maximum 
public subsidy to premiums (80%). Tariffs  show a significant reduction between 2003 and 
2004, but in 2005, compared with the previous year, there has not been a reduction maybe 
because of the increasing subscription of combined/named perils policies (Table 2).  
In 2006, insured value has diminished. This is partly due to the decrease in agricultural 
products prices but also to the stagnation in the number of subscribed policies. The only 
change happened is the different distribution of policies among the different insurance 
schemes. Namely, hail policies have diminished in favour of an increased number of named 
perils policies, most of all “wind and hail” policy (table 3). Another important element to be 
considered is loss ratio (indemnities/premiums) which is well below 1. This means that the 
amount of premiums paid is almost double respect to indemnities received by farmers. Even if 
administrative, management and survey costs were included, the profit margin of insurance 
companies is extremely high with reference to their agricultural portfolio. If we look at loss 
ratios in countries where the supply side of the insurance market is sufficiently fragmented 
and the ratio between indemnities and premiums is the result of a competitive market, the 
ratio value is very close to 1. 
 
Table  2:  Evolution of the subsidized crop insurance market in Italy (vegetable 
production) 
      2003 2004 2005  2006 Var.  % 
Policies  n°  213,293 212,231 212,383  211,444 -0.4 
Insured Production  .000  t  14,359 14,894 14,833  14,805 -0.2 
Insured Plants  .000  172,761 184.218 260,585  308,153 18.3 
Insured hectares  .000 ha  950  982  1,074  1,125 4.7 
Insured value  Mln  €  3,334 3,582 3,637  3,521  -3.2 
Premiums (P)  .000€  277,050 267.862 268,164  262,479 -2.1 
Indemnities (I)  .000€  116,647 177.439 159,771  145,291 -9.1 
State Contribution*  .000€  112,000 152,165 176,756  174,879 -1.1 
Average tariff  %  8.3 7.5 7.4  7,5 1.1 
I/P  %  42.1 66.2 59.6  55,4  -7.1 
Source: Own calculations on Ismea/Sicuragro data. 
 
Table 3:  Share of the different crop insurance schemes 
   2004  2005  2006 
Single peril (hail)  92.0 84.0 77.4 
Combined/named perils*  7.7 14.4  19.6 
All risk  0,3 1,7 2,9 
TOTAL  100   100  100  
*) this insurance scheme does not include coverage against hail, tornados, snow, hurricanes and lightning Source: Our elaboration on Ismea data 
 
Looking at loss ratio data relating some of the main regional and provincial Consorzi di 
Difesa in Italy, ranked in terms of insured value, we can see that data are consistent with 
national average and the discouraging aspect is that only three Consorzi out of seven show 
tariffs which are below national average. 
Table 4:  Insurance indicators concerning the main Consorzi di Difesa in terms of 
insurance value  
      2001 2002  2003  2004  2005 
     Percentage values 
TOSCANA* I/P  93.19  110.80  88.99  78.40  66.47 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  3.12 3.83  4.36  4.19  4.56 
PROVINCE OF CUNEO   I/P  80.42  122.28  27.43  93.05  55.20 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  12.64 13.15  12.76  10.41 9.33 
PROVINCE OF PAVIA  I/P  248.21  51.37  6.64  125.10  28.23 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  4.10 4.82  4.92  4.08  4.13 
PROVINCE OF VERONA  I/P  96.31  46.09  20.34  85.94  196.46 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  12.13 12.62  12.81  10.73  10.22 
PROVINCE OF FERRARA  I/P  129.30  136.33  33.31  49.94  57.00 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  10.83 11.70  12.42  10.54 9.85 
PROVINCE OF PERUGIA  I/P  25.31  184.51  18.75  35.35  17.63 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  6.85 6.46  7.90  6.69  7.24 
PROVINCE OF FOGGIA  I/P  37.03  93.94  34.47  50.13  84.50 
  AVERAGE 
TARIFF  5.90 5.54  6.13  4.54  4.56 
*) In Tuscany there is a single consorzio covering all provinces 
Source: Ismea/Sicuragro 
 
The ratio between insured value of production and crop gross production value is a good 
indicator of the level of diffusion of crop insurance. This ratio has reached its highest value, 
during the last five years, in 2005 (14%). According to estimates, during year 2006, insured 
value was 16% of gross crop production. This percentage does not differ significantly from 
the previous, most of all if we think that insurance is the only available tool for production 
risk management in case of adverse weather conditions (Table 3). 
 Table 5:  Value/Gross crop production value (Ml/€) 
   2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Gross crop production value  26.852  27.291  27.182  29.453  26.928 
Insured  value  3.232 3.216 3.406 3.716 3.797 
Insured value/ Gross crop production value  12,0%  11,8%  12,5%  12,6%  14,1% 
Source: Own calculations on Ismea and Istat data. 
 
To give an example of the diffusion of crop insurance per single product, we have chosen 
some fruit products. Given that these products are not storable and that they do not benefit of 
the CAP single farm payment, fruit products are expected to show a higher share of insurance 
if compared with the value of production. Unfortunately, except for apples, whose insured 
value is increasing during the years, the other products are characterised by values that 
express a scarce interest of producers towards insurance. 
 
3  Protecting agricultural income through weather derivatives in an Italian 
province 
Many authors have discussed the mechanism of hedging production risk through weather 
derivatives (TURVEY: 2000; BERG et al: 2006; HARTELL  et al. 2006), and therefore we would 
not repeat the details here.  
We follow Hartell et al. in identifying the steps to be made in designing a risk management 
strategy as follows: 
1.  Identifying significant exposure of an agricultural producer to weather; 
2.  Quantifying the impact of adverse weather on their revenues; 
3.  Structuring a contract that pays out when adverse weather occurs; and 
4.  Executing the contract in optimal form to transfer the risk, either to another party or to 
the international weather market. 
Each of these steps will require careful analysis and will present its specific challenges, yet 
the only truly essential precondition for such a mechanism to be devisable is that there exists 
an objectively measurable weather index which is highly correlated (either positively or 
negatively) with farm returns or with returns from one specific crops. 
In this paper, we apply the procedure to the case of the Italian province of Grosseto, for which 
detailed weather data are available through the web site of the Tuscany’s Agenzia Regionale 
di Sviluppo e Innovazione in Agricoltura (ARSIA-Toscana) and from the Laboratory of Agro-
Meteorology Modelling (LAMM) of the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). 
To determine farms’ exposure to weather conditions, one could proceed by analyzing 
experimental models of crop growth, in which the effects of various environmental conditions 
(such as air and soil temperature, humidity, sunlight, wind, etc) are assessed, or by referring to 
expert opinion of agronomists, or even by surveying farmers’ to collect their opinion on 
which ones are the most relevant weather parameters. 
Although highly informative, these experiments and data will mostly assess the ex ante 
potential impact of weather on crop yields, neglecting the host of possible practical responsive 
actions that farmers can take to control the specific conditions in their farms, often at a very 
low cost
2. We decided therefore to refer to actual data on farm yields and production as 
                                                 
2   Indeed one of the problems with large part of the economic literature on farm risk management has been 
precisely that of neglecting the possibility of farmers’ own response (see CAFIERO, 2003). recorded by official statistics (Istat, Rica) to have an indication of the residual variability in 
yields and income that needs to be hedged after all other responses by farmers have already 
been considered, and for which a potential demand for insurance might exist, and to regress 
them on some index of weather conditions. 
We collected the series of physical yields of the main crops in the area (wine grapes, fruits, 
cereals, industrial crops) from 1990 through 2004, and measured the correlation of such series 
with contemporaneous indexes of weather conditions, whose choice has been guided by 
regression analysis. In practice, we first reduced the number of weather dimensions through a 
principal component analysis (PCA), and then run a linear regression of the annual yield on 
the identified principal components of weather indexes. 




In this paper we present the results relative to wine grapes, soft and durum wheat yields in the 
province of Grosseto, in Tuscany. For each of the 18 weather stations in the province for 
which we have data, and for each of the months between January and August (for grapes), or 
between August of the previous year and May (for wheat) we considered the following 
weather data: 
v1: maximum daily temperature of the month; 
v2: minimum daily temperature of the month; 
v3: average of the maximum daily temperatures in the month; 
v4: average of the minimum daily temperatures in the month; 
v5: average of the average daily temperatures in the month;  
v6: average of the maximum daily humidity in the month; 
v7: average of the average daily humidity in the month;  
v8: total millimeters of rain in the month 
v9: number of rainy days in the month 
This gives us a total of 18 x 8 x 9 = 1296 (for grape) and 18 x 9 x 9 = 1458 (for wheat) 
weather variables, some of which are highly correlated among themselves.  
Of the 14 possible principal components, the first 9 capture most of the variability in the set of 
weather data, accounting for about 86.2% of the total variance in the case of grapes, and 86.6% in the case of wheat. We then run a regression of the average province’s yields of wine 
grapes, soft wheat and durum wheat on the nine identified principal components and obtained 
the results summarized in table 6 below and illustrated in figures 2, 3 and 4. 
The yield are obtained from two official sources: the Rica sample for the years 1990 through 
1998, and Istat for the years 1999 through 2004.
3  
 
Table 6:  Weather indexes highly correlated with average yields in Grosseto  




94,599 + 15,386 x1 – 7,306 x2 + 8,282 x3 – 2,339 x4 – 10,177 x5 + 9,619 x6 + 11,361 x7 – 19,844 x8 – 8,129 x9  0.904
Soft 
wheat 
28,262 + 3,280 x1 – 1,313 x2 – 2,023 x3 + 1,657 x4 + 0,957 x5 – 1,980 x6 -2,926 x7 -1,121 x8 -0,078 x9  0.834
Durum 
wheat 
30,266 + 3,973 x1 + 0,605 x2 -2,432 x3 + 0,174 x4 – 1,467 x5 – 0,811 x6 - 2,984 x7 -2,939 x8 + 1,571 x9  0.684
*) x1 through x9 are the factors extracted through the PCA 
 
Although each of the components of the index could be interpreted, based on the specific 
weather variables that enter in the principal component with high coefficients, the purpose of 
this exercise is not to “understand” the reasons for residual yield variation, rather to provide 
an objectively measurable index that “happens” to be highly correlated to the yield. Again, the 
reason why we decided to do so is because knowledge of the specific mechanism through 
which weather variables affect yields, while interesting on its own, is almost irrelevant to the 
purpose of defining an index to be used to design a possible weather derivative to be used to 
hedge yield risk: the only thing that truly matters is the correlation between the index and the 
yield. 
As measured by the R
2 of the regressions (see table 6) and as can be observed from the graphs 
in figure 3, 4 and 5, this correlation is quite high for the index we formed, although the close 
fit is in part due to the low number of degrees of freedom that results from a relatively low 
number of observations (15) compared with the number of explanatory variables included in 
the regression (9).  
 
                                                 
3   We are actively exploring the possibility of accessing the average yields at the sub-provincial level from the 
Rica archives, which should give us a reliable series of yields from 1980 through 2005. Figure 3:  Comparison between grape average yield and weather index 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 




Source: Own representation. 
 Figure 5:  Comparison between durum wheat average yield and weather index 
 
Source: Own representation. 
 
The next step is to explore the feasibility of an insurance scheme based on such an index, that 
is a contract that would pay an amount of (I* – I) each time the index I falls below the value 
I*.  
As an example consider the value I* = 75 quintals for the wine grapes case. Owning such a 
contract, the farmers in the sample, as a group, would have been able to eliminate the risk that 
their yield fell below 75 q/ha, an event that occurred four times over the period considered.  
From the graph above, it can be seen that each time the average yield has been below 75, also 
the index value has fallen below 75. Compared to a “pure” yield insurance, such a contract 
would have slightly overcompensated the representative farmer of the group in 1994, 1997 
and 2001. 
The feasibility of a market for such an insurance contract would depend on the difference 
between farmer’s willingness to pay for such a contract and the foreseeable premium, which 
in this case would likely be very close to the actuarially fair premium, given the absence of 
administrative costs due to loss adjustments, monitoring, etc.  
The actuarially fair premium could be determined as the expected indemnity (in the example, 
equal to 7,15 quintals of wine grape) if the distribution of yields and of weather variables 
observed in the years 1990-2004 were the long-run, invariant one.  
Farmers’ willingness to pay, on the other hand would depend both on the farmers’ degree of 
risk aversion and on the subjective distributions they hold on the yield and on the index. If we 
had a perfect correlation, that is, if the historic distribution of yields and of the index were the 
same, a risk neutral farmer’s willingness to pay would equal the actuarially fair premium. Any 
degree of risk aversion would make the farmers’ willingness to pay higher than the actuarially 
fair premium. An advantage of this kind of index insurance is, in fact, that farmers who hold 
better information on their ability to control yield might actually express a willingness to pay 
larger than the actuarially fair premium, if they know that they can adopt corrective measures 
in case the index falls below the threshold, and so prevent the yield to fall accordingly. In 
other words, such a mechanism for yield risk protection would manifest a “virtuous” 
selection, in that the low risk farmers would have a higher incentive to participate, as opposed 
to the usual adverse selection that plagues traditional yield crop insurance, where it is high 
risk farmers that have the highest incentive to participate. 
The precise distribution of an identified weather index could be better characterized if one 
could count on long series of data available through the weather stations, and therefore an actuarially fair premium could be determined as the expected revenues from the contract over 
a very long period, assuming, for the index, the empirical distribution detected, for example 
through a kernel analysis.
4 
By the date this draft has been prepared, we have yet to receive the long series of data from 
the CNR, which we know are available for many of the considered stations from 1950. In the 
meantime, we estimate the underlying distribution of the index based on the available data, 
either as a normal distribution with the same mean and variance, or by re-sampling from the 
realized values, and calculate the actuarially fair premium through simulation, which gives us 
the value of 5.51 and 4.69 respectively for the wine grape contract (I* = 75), 0.21 and 0.46 for 
the soft wheat contract (I* = 20) and 0.18 and 0.19 for the durum wheat contract (I* = 20). 
Given such premiums, we determine the series of yields that a producer in the area would 
have had on one hectare over the 14 years for which we have data, both with and without the 
hedge provided by the weather index contract.  
Then, we measured the change in certainty equivalent that this would have implied for three 
different degrees of risk aversion, assuming a CRRA utility function. The results for wine 
grapes, soft wheat and durum wheat are reported in tables 7, 8 and 9 below respectively. 
 
                                                 
4   In all of the subsequent analysis, we assumed the price of the product constant and equal to one. We also 
normalized the average yield and average utility to 100, so that utility benefits can be interpreted in terms of 
percentage of the value of the product, i.e., a gain of 8.0 is to be read as a gain equivalent to 8% of the 
average returns from that crop. Table  7:  Benefits to wine-grape farmers from hedging through a weather based 
index (threshold I* = 75) 









premium = 4.69 
1990  90.3  84.73  85.61 
1991  101  95.55  96.31 
1992  76.6  71.01  71.91 
1993  85.1  79.53  80.41 
1994  64.1  82.04  82.89 
1995  133  127.25  128.31 
1996  110  103.95  105.31 
1997  70  72.66  73.51 
1998  199  193.85  194.31 
1999  89.1  83.55  84.41 
2000  97.3  91.75  92.61 
2001  61.3  55.75  72.03 
2002  77.5  71.95  72.81 
2003  56.2  69.25  70.11 
2004  109  102.95  104.31 
Average  94.63  92.38  94.32 
Standard Deviation  35.60  33.08  32.03 
Coefficient of Variation  0.38  0.36  0.34 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1  0.08  0.93 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1.5  0.71  1.56 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 3  2.55  3.42 
 Table  8:  Benefits to soft wheat farmers from hedging through a weather based 
index (I* = 20) 









premium = 0.4633 
1990  23.31  23.10  22.85 
1991  28.28  28.07  27.82 
1992  22.44  22.23  21.98 
1993  26.88  26.67  26.42 
1994  31.82  31.61  31.36 
1995  35.00  34.79  34.54 
1996  26.61  26.40  26.15 
1997  28.11  27.90  27.65 
1998  16.98  20.25  19.99 
1999  34.50  34.29  34.04 
2000  37.00  36.79  36.54 
2001  25.00  24.79  24.54 
2002  35.00  34.79  34.54 
2003  18.00  21.26  21.00 
2004  35.00  34.79  34.54 
Average  28.26  28.52  28.26 
Standard Deviation  6.38  5.62  5.62 
Coefficient of variation  0.23  0.20  0.20 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1  0.46  0.20 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1.5  0.59  0.32 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 3  1.03  0.75 
(1) Premium obtained by sampling from actual index values 
(2) Premium obtained by assuming normal distribution of index value 
 
 Table 9:  Benefits to durum wheat farmers from hedging through a weather based 
index (threshold I* = 20) 
year  Returns w/o hedge (R1)  Return w/ hedge
(1) 
(R2) 




premium = 0.1917 
1990  42.22  42.04  42.03 
1991  34.96  34.78  34.77 
1992  38.66  38.48  38.47 
1993  30.33  30.15  30.14 
1994  29.06  28.88  28.87 
1995  39.00  38.82  38.81 
1996  24.38  24.20  24.19 
1997  29.04  28.86  28.85 
1998  21.36  21.18  21.17 
1999  31.80  31.62  31.61 
2000  30.00  29.82  29.81 
2001  18.00  17.82  17.81 
2002  27.00  26.82  26.81 
2003  15.00  17.70  17.69 
2004  35.00  34.82  34.81 
Average  29.72 
29.73  29.72 
Standard Deviation  7.76 
7.40  7.40 
Coefficient of Variation  0.26 
0.25  0.25 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1  0.15  0.14 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 1.5  0.25  0.23 
Δ Certainty Equivalent ρ = 3  0.63  0.61 
 
4  Discussion and suggestions for further research 
Even if based on data from one province, the results we have presented suggest that there is 
the possibility of using the available data from a diffused network of weather stations in Italy 
to define measurable indexes on which to base contracts to insure yield risk.  
Availability of data, at the moment, forced us to analyze yield risk only at the provincial level, 
which is likely not the most efficient way of exploiting the wealth of available weather data, 
and we plan in the immediate future to extend the analysis to the level of smaller, more 
homogeneous geographic areas. Nevertheless, even at the provincial level, we have been able 
to construct indexes that follows very closely the average yield of the years between 1990 and 
2004, confirming that yield variation can be linked to objectively measurable weather 
characteristics. 
The three crops on which we focused do not differ in terms of the residual yield risk 
manifested in official data, and therefore in terms of the potential benefits that farmers might 
receive from participating to an insurance plan of the type we envisage.  
Wine grape growers would receive a benefit of up to 1.5% of the average yield for a not 
uncommon degree of risk aversion, while the corresponding figures for soft and durum wheat 
growers would be of  1.0% and 0.6% respectively. The limits of the results obtained so far are linked to the delay that we have experienced in 
accessing some of the data that we know are available. First, by limiting the characterization 
of the weather index to only 14 observations, those that are available from the public Arsia 
website, we do not fully exploit the advantage that these data have been collected and 
recorded at least from the 1950’s for many weather stations. This makes the characterization 
of the principal components used to define the index and the estimation of the distribution of 
the index a little shaky. With more information we will surely improve on these two aspects.  
Second, we have referred to the crops’ yields at the provincial level which is not as 
homogeneous as we would like in terms of the characters of the agricultural production. A 
smaller geographical area, including only a few municipalities, similar for soil and weather 
conditions, would be ideal to the task of linking yields to current weather conditions.
5 
Nevertheless, the fact that we find significant correlation of the province’s average yield with 
weather indexes, opens the possibility that farmers’ associations, at the provincial level, might 
exploit the possibility of using the index to hedge their common yield risk, while using other 
kinds of agreements (for example, through cooperatives or mutual funds) to hedge the more 
idiosyncratic components of individual farmers’ yield risk.  
Apart from the just mentioned extensions we are working on, many possible lines of further 
research stem from the preliminary results we present here. 
For example, we limited our exploration of the indexes to simple linear combination of the 
weather principal components. A more extended and detailed exploration of other flexible 
forms might reveal indexes that follows more closely the lower tail of the yield distribution, 
which is basically what is needed for an index intended to protect against dramatic yield 
shortfalls. Also, there is a large potential for the fact that, once a system of yield insurance as 
the one we devise is in place, its financial exposure might be hedged by spreading the risk 
with other economic agents outside agriculture, who might hold opposite stances relative to 
the same or closely related weather indexes. One natural example comes to mind for 
territories where agriculture and tourism coexist, and it is reasonable to conceive that the 
sectors might have competing interests relative to, for example, rain in the summer. The 
obvious research task, then would be that of analyzing data on the effects of weather on other 
economic activities in the same areas, and to explore the performance of a joint fund, pooling 
all the areas’ weather related risk together. 
5 Conclusion   
In this paper we have explored the possibility of constructing a weather index based insurance 
contract to protect yield variation of three crops in the Italian province of Grosseto. The data 
from 18 weather stations in the area have been used to construct indexes highly correlated 
with the measured provincial average yields, as reported by official sources. 
The advantages of such an option over the current Italian system, based on a combination of 
subsidized crop insurance and ex-post compensation are numerous, thanks to the potential 
great reduction of transaction costs linked to the informational problems that plague 
traditional crop insurance, and to the much more easy practical implementation of a 
mechanism based on objectively measurable indexes, rather than on a complex mechanism of 
damage assessment. If it is true that, for many open field crops, the fundamental yield 
variation can be either directly or indirectly linked to weather condition (and our preliminary 
results provide strong evidence in this respect), then a mechanism based on weather indexes 
seems most appropriate. 
To reiterate, the advantages would be linked to the facts that: 
                                                 
5   We will explore this possibility in the next few weeks thanks to the data from the Rica samples that have 
been collected since 1980 and that can be classified at the level of the so-called “regione agraria”. a)  no single farmer could strategically affect the value of the composite weather index, 
and therefore no costly damage adjustment would be needed; 
b)  farmers who hold better information on their ability to control yield might actually 
have more incentive to participate. A “virtuous” selection can be imagined, thus 
reducing the costs of providing the risk management service, as opposed to the 
adverse selection that plagues traditional yield crop insurance, where it is high risk 
farmers that have the highest incentive to participate; 
c)  the public nature of the weather information would stimulate competition among 
supplier of the risk management tools, in case there would be a profit to be made, 
therefore by reducing the problem of rent capturing that so often plagues the insurance 
industry; 
d)  yield risk management through weather index based derivatives could promote the 
culture of using such instruments among farmers, and financial instruments might 
soon be useful in the conditions of the European agriculture to hedge also price risk, 
now that the price stabilization effect implicit in the CAP has been eliminated; 
e)  most importantly, the development of such a system would require no major reform in 
the existing legislative framework in many European countries, to the extent that 
index based coverage could be included among the possible contracts offered by 
insurance companies to farmers (and, at the beginning, also entitled to public support, 
in accordance with the EU guidelines on state aids) or among the publicly provided 
risk management tools (for example, by linking ex-post compensation in an area to 
specific values of the composite index rather than to a complex and politically 
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